The discussion raises issues of independent interest for the moral philosopher such as the possibilities and bounds of interpersonal moral obligations and the nature of commitment. Further, the special value accorded marriage sustains amatonormative discrimination, or amatonormativity – discrimination against non-amorous or non-exclusive caring relationships such as friendships, adult care networks, polyamorous groups, or urban tribes. The book contends with the most influential philosophical accounts of the moral value of marriage to argue that it has no inherent moral significance. In Part One, “De-Moralizing Marriage,” essays on promise and commitment argue that we cannot promise to love and so wedding vows are (mostly) failed promises, and that marriage may be a poor commitment strategy. Yet what is its moral significance? This book examines its morally salient features – promise, commitment, care, and contract – with surprising results. This book seeks to answer these questions, and more.Īn overview of Minimizing Marriage by Elizabeth Brake (OUP, 2012)Įven in secular contexts, marriage retains sacramental connotations. What is the moral or ethical significance of marriage? Why shouldn’t friends or small groups have rights to the extensive legal benefits of marriage?Īre feminist criticisms of marriage law valid – given egalitarian reforms? Why is the state involved in marriage at all?ĭoesn’t same-sex marriage still discriminate – against polyamorists, polygamists, asexuals, and those who build their lives around friendships, not romantic sexual relationships?
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |